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Abstract 
In a fundamental contribution, Prescott and Townsend (1984) [PT] have shown that the 
existence and efficiency properties of Walrasian equilibria extend to economies with moral 
hazard, when agents' trades are observable (exclusive contracts can be implemented). More 
recently, Bennardo and Chiappori (2003) [BC] have argued that Walrasian equilibria may 
(robustly) fail to exist when the class of moral hazard economies considered by Prescott 
and Townsend is generalized to allow for the presence of aggregate, in addition to 
idiosyncratic, uncertainty and for preferences which are nonseparable in consumption and 
effort. We re-examine here the existence and efficiency properties of Walrasian equilibria 
in the moral hazard economy considered by Bennardo and Chiappori. We show that 
Walrasian equilibria always exist in such economy and are incentive efficient, so the results 
of Prescott and Townsend continue to hold in the more general set-up considered by 
Bennardo and Chiappori. 
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1 The Environment
Our notation is slightly adapted so as to be closer to the one in PT. There is a continuum of ex
ante identical individuals with measure one and a single consumption good. Individuals are subject
to both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk. Specifically, there are two aggregate states, s = H,L, and
two idiosyncratic states, σ = 1, 2. The individual’s endowment ωσs depends on the realization of
both s and σ. Without loss of generality ωσs is assumed to be higher in aggregate state s = H than
in s = L for each realization of the idiosyncratic state σ: ωσH > ω
σ
L. Likewise, ω
σ
s is higher when the
idiosyncratic state σ = 1 is realized, no matter what is the aggregate state s : ω1s > ω2s. Idiosyncratic
shocks are independently and identically distributed across all agents, and are independent of the
aggregate shock. The probability πs of aggregate state s is exogenous. On the other hand, the
probability of idiosyncratic state σ depends on the level of effort of the individual. Effort can be
high or low; the set of effort levels is then E ≡ {el, eh} and we assume that effort is undertaken
by the individual prior to the realization of uncertainty (both aggregate and idiosyncratic). Let
πeσ denote the probability of idiosyncratic state σ when the agent exerts effort e ∈ E; we assume
that 0 < πel1 < πeh1 < 1. In words, the probability that the high-endowment idiosyncratic state is
realized is higher when effort is high. The realization of the aggregate and idiosyncratic states is
public, but the individual choice of effort is not.
Individuals have von Neumann-Morgernstern preferences described by the Bernoulli utility func-
tion u : <+ × E → <. The utility of consumption c when effort e is undertaken, ue(c) ≡ u(c, e),
is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave with limc→0 u0e(c) =∞
and limc→∞ u0e(c) = 0. Effort is costly, so uel(c) > ueh(c) for all c ∈ C.
Following PT, as well as BC, we assume that the set of possible consumption levels in any state
is given by a finite subset of <+, denoted by C. Let Z be then the set of possible state-contingent
net trades of an individual. It is convenient to write Z = ZH × ZL, where Zs is the set of possible
net trades in aggregate state s
Zs =
©
( z1s , z
2
s) ∈ <2 : zσs + ωσs ∈ C, σ = 1, 2
ª
.
Elements of Z are then denoted z = (zH , zL).
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2 The General Equilibrium Model
Commodities. The commodities traded in the model are insurance contracts. An insurance
contract specifies an effort level e ∈ E and a vector of state-contingent net trades z ∈ Z. This
specification is allowed to be random. The commodity space L is so the set of measures on E ×Z.
Since the set E×Z is finite, L is isomorphic to the Euclidean space of dimension n, where n is the
cardinality of E × Z :1
L =M(E × Z) = <n.
An insurance contract x is described as a probability measure on E × Z; i.e., a vector x =
{x(e, z)}(e,z)∈E×Z ∈ P (E × Z) where
P (E × Z) ≡ {x ∈ L+ :
X
(e,z)∈E×Z
x(e, z) = 1}.
Here, x(e, z) represents the probability that the contract specifies effort e and net trade z.
For a given contract x, let xe ∈ P (E) denote the marginal probability distribution with respect
to e. This marginal distribution describes the probability that the contract specifies high and
low effort. Also, let xz/e ∈ P (Z) denote the conditional distribution of z for a given effort e;
this specifies a random vector of state-contingent net trades assigned when effort e is specified.
Intuitively, the specification of the contract can be interpreted as follows. First, the lottery xe
prescribes an effort level. For any realization e of this lottery, a second lottery xz/e specifies the
level of net trades in every state. Both lotteries are realized prior to the realization of the aggregate
and idiosyncratic states. Since the effort undertaken by an individual is his private information, the
specification of an effort level has to be understood only as a prescription, which to be effective must
satisfy appropriate incentive compatibility constraints. It is also convenient to define the marginal
probability distribution with respect to (e, zs), which we denote by xs ∈ P (E×Zs); this determines
the (random) effort level together with the (random) level of net trades in each idiosyncratic state
when aggregate state s is realized.
The expected utility of an individual who exerts effort e and receives a net trade z is
v (e, z) ≡
X
s=H,L
πs
X
σ=1,2
πeσue(ωσs + z
σ
s ).
1An equivalent (though slightly more involved) analysis can be carried out when C is an infinite set (e.g., C = R+),
and M(E × Z) is then endowed with the weak-star topology (see for instance Jerez (2005)). The results presented
here extend to that case.
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The expected utility from a contract x is then given by the scalar product
v · x =
X
(e,z)∈E×Z
v (e, z)x(e, z). (1)
Admissible Trades. Since trades are assumed to be observable, any restriction on trades can be
imposed. Following PT, the set of contracts available for trade to any individual (in short, with
some abuse of language, her consumption set) is the set of contracts that satisfy the incentive
compatible (IC) constraints:
X¯ = {x ∈ P (E × Z) :
X
z∈Z
v (e, z)xz/e(z) ≥
Z
Z
v
¡
e0, z
¢
xz/e0(z), e 6= e0; e, e0 ∈ E}.
The IC constraints require that, whenever contract x prescribes effort e, the implied conditional
probability distribution xz/e is such that individuals prefer to conform to the effort prescription e
rather than deviating to e0.
Prices. Prices are linear on the agents’ consumption set, i.e. they are linear in probabilities. A
price system is then an element of the linear space L : p = {p(e, z)}(e,z)∈E×Z ∈ L. The cost of a
commodity bundle x ∈ L is given by the scalar product
p · x =
X
(e,z)∈E×Z
p (e, z)x (e, z) . (2)
Resource constraints. The economy is subject to two resource constraints, one for each aggregate
state s. These constraints ensure that aggregate consumption in each state s does not exceed the
aggregate endowment in that state. We will look at symmetric allocations, where all individuals
trade the same contract x. By the Law of Large Numbers, when all individuals exert effort e, the
fraction of individuals who end up in idiosyncratic state σ is πeσ. Hence, the total (per capita) use
of resources in state s when all individuals exert effort e and receive the net trade vector zs is
rs (e, zs) ≡
X
σ
πeσzσs , s = H,L.
Under contract x ∈ X, the total use of resources in state s is then given by the scalar product
rs · xs =
X
(e,zs)∈E×Zs
rs (e, zs)xs(e, zs), (3)
where, as we have noted, xs is the marginal probability distribution of x with respect to (e, zs).
A contract (or symmetric allocation) x satisfies the resource constraints if the total net use of
resources is non-positive in both aggregate states:
rs · xs ≤ 0, s = H,L. (4)
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3 Incentive Efficient Allocations
A (symmetric) allocation x is feasible if x ∈ X¯ and x satisfies the aggregate resource constraints
(4). An allocation x is then incentive efficient if it maximizes the individual expected utility in the
set of feasible allocations:
max
x∈X¯
v · x s.t rs · xs ≤ 0, s = H,L. (5)
The objective function in problem (5) is linear (and thus continuous) and the feasible set is a
non-empty,2 closed and bounded subset of the Euclidean space. Therefore, an optimal solution to
the problem always exists. Also, it is easy to check that the feasible set is convex (in words, if
contracts x and x0 satisfy the incentive compatibility and resource constraints, so does any convex
combination of these contracts).
4 Competitive equilibria
Following PT as well as BC, we introduce intermediation firms who supply contracts to consumers.
Each firm is characterized by a technology:
Y = {y ∈ L : rs · ys ≤ 0, s = H,L} , (6)
where ys denotes the projection of the measure y on the set E × Zs. The specification in (6) says
that a firm can offer any set of contracts, given by probability distributions over effort levels and
net trades in every state, subject to the only constraint that the total net payments required by the
contracts offered are self-financing. The Law of Large Numbers is applied to the set of contracts
offered by a firm, allowing to write the self-financing constraint in expected terms in each aggregate
state. Positive (resp. negative) components of y constitute commitments for the firm to pay (rights
to receive) resources in a given state s, σ, given e.
Since Y displays constant returns to scale, profits will be zero in equilibrium and there is no
loss of generality in assuming that there is a single firm in the market.
Definition A competitive equilibrium is a triple (x∗, y∗; p∗) ∈ L3 such that: (i) x∗ maximizes v · x
over the set {x ∈ X¯ : p∗ · x ≤ 0}; (ii) y∗ maximizes p∗ · y over the set Y ; and (iii) markets clear,
or x∗ = y∗.
2The allocation where individuals exert low effort with probability one and consume their expected endowment
in each aggregate state s is clearly always feasible.
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Condition (i) requires that contract x∗ gives every individual the highest utility among all
budget feasible contracts lying in his consumption set. Condition (ii) says that y∗ is a solution
of the firm’s problem, consisting in the choice of a vector y lying in the set Y that maximizes
profits. The market clearing condition (iii) says that aggregate demand by consumers for insurance
contracts equals aggregate supply by the firm.
5 Efficiency and Existence of Equilibrium
In this section, we show that a competitive equilibria always exists (in contrast with Proposition 5
of BC).
Theorem 1 In the economy under consideration, a competitive equilibrium always exists. In
particular, any (symmetric) incentive efficient allocation can be supported as a competitive equi-
librium.
Proof: Let ps (e, zs) denote the projection of p(e, z) on the set E×Zs, so that p(e, z) = pH(e, zH)+
pL(e, zL). It is immediate to verify (see also Lemma 3 in BC) that the constant returns to scale
nature of the firms’ technology Y implies that equilibrium prices satisfy the following property:
ps (e, zs) = βsrs (e, zs) , (7)
for some βs ≥ 0, for each s = H,L; i.e., in each state s the price of (e, zs) must either be actuarially
fair, and be proportional to the expected use of resources at zs when agents exert effort e, or be
zero.
To make the comparison with BC easier, the rest of proof relies on a constructive argument:
for any possible solution xE of the planner’s problem (5), we will find prices satisfying (7) which
support xE as a competitive equilibrium.
Since preferences are monotone, at xE the resource constraint must bind in at least one state s.
It is easy to see why: suppose both constraints were slack. Let xl be a contract specifying low effort
and an arbitrarily high level of net trades with probability one (regardless of the realization of s
and σ). Contract xl is incentive compatible (xl ∈ X¯) and strictly preferred to xE by the individual,
and hence so is any convex combination of xE and xl : xα = (1−α)xE +αxl with α ∈ (0, 1]. Also,
if α is sufficiently small, xα satisfies the resource constraints (4). But then xE cannot be a solution
to (5).
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Consider then the case where at xE the resource constraint does not bind in one aggregate state,
in particular in s = H. This is the case analyzed in Proposition 5 of BC.3 We will show that the
following prices, given by (7) with βH = 0 and βL = 1, support xE as a competitive equilibrium:
p∗H(e, zH) = 0 for all e ∈ E, zH ∈ ZH , (8)
p∗L(e, zL) = rL(e, zL) for all e ∈ E, zL ∈ ZL. (9)
The intuition is simple. The price associated to state s is the shadow cost of resources in s at an
incentive-efficient allocation. Because the resource constraint in state s = H is slack, the shadow
cost is zero in this state for any pair (e, zH). On the other hand, the resource constraint in state
s = L is binding, so in this state the shadow cost is positive and proportional (in fact can be set
equal) to the expected use of resources associated to any pair (e, zL). In sum, prices are zero in
state s = H and actuarially fair in state s = L.
When consumers face the price system in (8)-(9), the consumer’s problem becomes:
max
x∈X¯
v · x s.t p∗ · x = rL · xL ≤ 0. (10)
We show next that xE is a solution to this problem (so that condition (i) of the definition of a
competitive equilibrium is satisfied). Since the resource constraint in state s = H does not bind
in the planner’s problem (5), xE is a local maximum of the same problem when this constraint is
omitted. And, because the objective function is linear and the feasible set is convex in (10), a local
maximum is also a global maximum by the local-global theorem (Intriligator (1971), p. 75).
Substituting the values in (8)-(9) for p∗ in the expression of the firm’s profits gives
p∗ · y = rL · yL,
so (6) implies p∗ · y ≤ 0 for all y ∈ Y . The market clearing condition (iii) requires then y∗ = xE.
Since the resource constraint for s = L binds in the planner’s problem,
p∗ · y∗ = rL · xEL = 0.
3BC derive some sufficient conditions for xE to have this property and show that there is an open set of economies
which satisfy them. Intuitively, if consumption and leisure are complements and the marginal utility of consumption
decreases fast enough with effort, there is a limit to the level of consumption such that agents are still willing to
provide high effort. Hence, when the aggregate endowment in s = H is high enough, part of the aggregate endowment
will not be consumed in that state.
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Thus y∗ is an optimal production plan for the firm. The firm’s optimization condition (ii) then
also holds, which completes the proof of the claim that a competitive equilibrium exists in the case
under consideration, supporting the efficient allocation xE .
It remains so to examine the case where both resource constraints bind at xE. The allocation
can now be decentralized with the following prices:
p∗H(e, zH) = βELrL(e, zL) for all e ∈ E, zH ∈ ZH (11)
p∗L(e, zL) = βEHrL(e, zL) for all e ∈ E, zL ∈ ZL, (12)
where βEL and β
E
H are the shadow prices of the resource constraints at the solution of the planner’s
problem (5). One can again show that at such prices xE solves the consumer’s problem. Since xE,
βEL and β
E
H solve the first order conditions of the planner’s problem, x
E also solves the first order
conditions of the consumer’s problem at the prices in (11)-(12) when the Lagrange multiplier of the
budget constraint equals one. The reason is that, at the above values, the Lagrangean functions
of the two problems have the same form. The rest of the argument is identical to the one of the
previous case. ¥
Remark 1 In equilibrium aggregate consumption is lower than the aggregate endowment in state
s = H (i.e. there are resources not utilized in the high-endowment state). However, there is no
incentive compatible and budget feasible contract that provides the consumer a higher utility than
at xE by allowing her to consume additional resources when s = H is realized. This claim is in
contrast with the one in the proof of Lemma 4 in BC. The authors argue that, if the price associated
to net trades in state H were zero regardless of the effort level, the consumer could do better by
buying a different contract x0 where x0H specifies low effort and a very high level of net trades (and
hence of consumption) with probability one, whatever the idiosyncratic outcome. Since x0 is clearly
not feasible, BC concluded that p∗H(e, zH) could not be zero at an equilibrium; the nonexistence
result in Proposition 5 then relies on such claim. But this misses an important point. Namely,
that effort is chosen before the realization of the aggregate state, so if x0H specifies low effort with
probability one so must x0L. While a contract specifying low effort with probability one can provide
a very high level of consumption if the high-endowment state s = H is realized, consumption in
the low-endowment state s = L may have to be rather low. The consumer in fact needs to pay a
positive price for the consumption goods received in state L, and the price can be quite high - and
the value of the endowment quite low - in s = L when the consumer exerts low effort.
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Formally, if (as claimed by BC) x0 is feasible for the consumer it must induce agents to exert
low effort (incentive compatibility has to hold) and the budget constraint must be satisfied:
p∗ · x0 = p∗H · x0H + p∗L · x0L = rL · x0L ≤ 0.
Since x0 is strictly preferred to xE by the consumer, so is any convex combination of xE and
x0 : xβ = (1 − β)xE + βx0 with β ∈ (0, 1]. For any β, xβ satisfies the incentive compatibility
constraints and the resource constraints in state L. Also, since at xE the resource constraint in
s = H is slack, if β is sufficiently small, the same is true at xβ. But this would contradict the fact
that xE is a solution to (5).
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